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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The General Assembly of North Carolina in the 1955 session, in-
corporated such a provision into the North Carolina statute.40 Decisions
from other jurisdictions interpreting and applying such a provision have
demonstrated its usefulness.47
It is believed that the recent amendment to the North Carolina statute
will aid in the accomplishment of the purposes for which it was enacted
by making the absent resident amenable to the substituted service. It is
also believed that the amendment will eliminate, to a great extent, the
issue raised in the principal case, but for one possible exception. This
would arise when a motorist, who is an actual resident of North Carolina
but has his domicile in another state, has an accident in North Carolina,
and the plaintiff attempts to serve him under the non-resident motorist
statute. If the defendant claims to be a resident of North Carolina and
thus not amenable to service under the statute, a "direct judicial review"
of the meaning of "non-resident" would be required.
Because of the fact "that the holdings as to what constitutes residence,
domicile, etc., vary according to the purposes of the statutes," 48 the
legislature should make it clear what meaning is to be given "non-resi-
dent" as used in the North Carolina Non-Resident Motorist Statute.
ROBERT L. SPENCER.
Taxation-Tax Fraud Cases-Use of Net Worth Method
In December of 1954, the United States Supreme Court handed down
four decisions involving the use of the net worth method of discovering
unreported income in prosecutions for attempted evasion of income
taxes.' This note is an effort to examine the state of the law as it exists
in the lower federal courts and to determine what effect the decisions
of the Supreme Court will have upon the rules as laid down by the lower
courts.
STAT. ANNOTATIONS § 170.55 (1949) (six months); N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC
LAw § 52a (thirty days).
" N. C. Sess. Laws (1955) c. 232. See, Survey of Statutory Changes, p. -,
sup ra.
" Ogdon v. Granakos, 415 Ill. 591, 114 N. E. 2d 686 (1953); State ex rel.
Thompson v. District Court, 108 Mont. 362, 91 P. 2d 422 (1939) ; Reed v. Lombardi,
266 App. Div. 44, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 382 (2d Dep't 1943).
"' Hart v. Queen City Coach Co., 241 N. C. 389, 391, 85 S. E. 2d 319, 321 (1955).
'Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121; Friedburg v. Unoted States, 348
U. S. 142; Smith v. United States, 348 U. S. 147; United States v. Calderon,
348 U. S. 160.
In Sullivan v. United States, 348 U. S. 170, decided at the same time, the Gov-
ernment had used the net worth method in prosecuting the case, but the issues
raised on appeal were whether a federal district attorney could prosecute a tax
case without the sanction of the Department of Justice and whether the trial court
erred in denying defendant's post-sentencing motion to withdraw pleas of nolo
contendere. Since no issues as to the use of the net worth method were raised on
appeal, the case will not be considered.
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Essentially, the use of the net worth method involves the calculation
of the net worth of the taxpayer at the beginning and end of each year
in question. The difference between these figures plus non-deductible
expenses during the same year is calculated to be taxable income.
Originally, the method was used against racketeers, 2 to corroborate
specific proof of unreported income from sources not disclosed by the
taxpayer's income tax returns.3 Today, it is frequently employed to
test the accuracy of the income tax returns of business and professional
men.4 By its use, the United States is realizing revenue it would other-
wise be unable to collect and prosecuting tax evaders who otherwise
might never be apprehended.
The instances in which the government can prove undisclosed in-
come by direct evidence are rare indeed. Therefore, it is necssary that
the government have available means of proving its case indirectly. This
is the reason and justification for the use of the method. There is,
however, reason to think that upon occasion the net worth method is
used even though direct evidence is available.5 Its use under such cir-
cumstances should not be allowed since the method involves great danger
to the rights of the taxpayer, as hereinafter discussed. Zealousness in
the collection of the revenue is highly commendable but should not lead
to unethical practices.
The authority for the use of indirect proof of unreported income is
given by the Internal Revenue Code (1954) Section 446 (b).6 There
has been no limitation of this authority to civil cases as evidenced by
the fact that all four of the cases presently under discussion are criminal
prosecutions.
Dangers in Use
The consideration which should serve as a limitation on the use of
" Report of the Assistant Attorney General, 4 P-H 1955 FED. TAX SERv. 1 34,013
(1955).
'In United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 503 (1943), its use was approved to
support the inference that income of a substantial amount had been received from
a vast network of gambling houses during the years in which there was no income
reported from this source. The four cases decided in December of last year, how-
ever, all concern income from the same source that produced the taxpayer's re-
ported income.
'See note 2 supra.
' In United States v. Riganto, 121 F. Supp. 158, 159 (E. D. Va. 1954), Judge
Hutcheson states that, "Basing my observation upon a number of cases during the
past few years, it would seem that the use of one or both of these methods [net
worth method and bank deposits and expenditures method] has been employed
through preference at times when direct evidence is available."
* "Exceptions-If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the
taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of
taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary
or his delegate, does clearly reflect income." This prerequisite to the use of in-
direct methods of proof, that the taxpayer's method of accounting must be such
that it does not clearly reflect his income, seems to demand only that the agents
of the government so state. This problem is discussed later in this note.
19551
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the method is that it is fraught with danger to the taxpayer.7 The jury
may assume that once the government has established its computation,
the crime of tax evasion automatically follows. Though it sounds plau-
sible to say that the taxpayer should be able to explain the "bulge" in
his net worth, he may be honestly unable to recount his financial history.
As a practical matter, to force the taxpayer to explain such a "bulge"
would tend to shift the burden of proof to the defendant, despite the
recognized rule that the burden may not be shifted in criminal prosecu-
tion or civil fraud cases.8
Specific Problems
From these general considerations in the use of the net worth method,
we turn to a consideration of specific problems involved in its use. A
criminal conviction does not prevent the imposition of a civil penalty
nor does a previously imposed civil penalty prevent a criminal convic-
tion.9 Therefore, both types of action will be considered.
a. Adequacy of Records
One of the most frequent defenses offered by taxpayers has been that
indirect methods of proof could not be used when the taxpayer's books
were, on their face, complete and accurate, unless the government showed
specific omissions or inaccuracies. A number of lower courts had con-
sidered this contention justified.10 In the Holland case, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Internal Revenue Code, (1939) Section 4111 did
not so limit the Commissioner. It held that when the use of the method
seems to disclose unreported income not reflected on the taxpayer's
records, the records have been shown to contain false entries or to have
serious omissions. Skillful concealment should not be an invincible
barrier to proof.'
2
"[T]here is danger of the case being tried on a theory which, keeping to the
ear the promise that a defendant is presumed innocent until his guilt is established
beyond a reasonable doubt, breaks it to the hope by allowing a series of theoretical
estimates and computations as to defendant's income to take the place of proof of
it." Demetree v. United States, 207 F. 2d 892, 893 (5th Cir. 1953).
' Holland v. United States. The Court also said: "Were the taxpayer compelled
to come forward with evidence to explain the "bulge" in his net worth, he might
risk lending support to the Government's case by showing loose business methods
or losing the jury through his apparent evasiveness." 348 U. S. 121, 128 (1954).
See also Demetree v. United States, 207 F. 2d 892 (5th Cir. 1953).
' Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492 (1943) ; Slick v. United States, 1 F. 2d
897 (7th Cir. 1924).
"0 United States v. Riganto, 121 F. Supp. 158 (E. D. Va. 1954) ; Ragsdale v.
Paschal, 118 F. Supp. 280 (E. D. Ark. 1954); Talley v. Commissioner, 20 T. C.
715 (1953) ; Booker W. Evans, P-H 1954 MEM. DEc. 54,014 (1954).
"
1 Now INT. REv. CODE § 446 (1954).
" There were cases in the lower courts which had adopted the same view. The
Court of Claims speaking in Jacobs v. United States, 54-2 U. S. T. C. 9740 (1954),
said: "The law allows the Commissioner to use another method if the taxpayer's
method loes not clearly reflect income. To determine this question itself involves
computation of. income by some alternative method. Another method of accounting
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In two cases the lower courts have allowed the use of the method13
even though the taxpayer's books have appeared adequate. One of these
cases14 even held that the taxpayer had no right to have the question of
the sufficiency of his records submitted to the jury as the government
had a right to use the net worth method whether his records were ade-
quate or not. If this rule is limited to the adequacy of the records, there
is nothing wrong with this statement of the law. It would, however, be
unjustifiable to extend this rule to accuracy because the very thing which
the government is attempting to show by the use of the net worth method
is that the books are not accurate, i.e., that they are false or incomplete.
b. Burden of Proof
Having thus established the right to make use of the net worth
method, the government faces the problem of proving its case through
the use of that method. The government usually presents evidence
showing, by an itemized list, the assets of the taxpayer at the beginning
and end of each year in question. It also presents itemized lists of non-
deductible expenses of the taxpayer for each of those years. Then, the
calculations made from these figures and the results achieved are pre-
sented. The general rule in civil cases is that once the government has
so established its net worth calculations the accuracy of those calculations
is presumed subject to rebuttal by the taxpayer.' 5 But the burden of
proof remains upon the government to prove fraudulent intent in civil
fraud cases and to prove willful intention to evade income taxes in crimi-
nal cases. 16 The use of the net worth method involves the use of cir-
cumstantial evidence, but it is not necessary that such circumstantial
evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt;
"[T]he better rule is that where the jury is properly instructed
on the standards for reasonable doubt, such an additional instruc-
tion on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect.' 17
may not be used unless one can show by use of that method that the taxpayer's own
method does not clearly state income." The Tax Court also limited its pronounce-
ment that the net worth method cannot be used when the taxpayer's books are
complete and accurate. "And when the increase in net worth is greater than that
reported on the taxpayer's returns or is inconsistent with such books and records
as are maintained by him, the net worth method is cogent evidence that there is
unreported income or that the books and records are inadequate, inaccurate or
false."
"1 Dupree v. United States, 218 F. 2d 781 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Earl Kite, 22 P-H
MEmo T. C. 53-865 (1953).
14 Dupree v. United States, supra note 13.
'
5
BALTER, FRAUD UNDER FEDERAL TAX LAw 177 (2d ed.; Chicago: Commerce
Clearing House, 1953).
10 Holland v. United States; United States v. Skidmore, 123 F. 2d 604 (7th Cir.
1941).
17 Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121, 139 (1954).
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c. Opening Net Worth
To establish the offense or penalty by the use of the net worth
method, the government must prove with "reasonable certainty" that its
opening net worth figure is accurate, that is, that the value of the assets
of the accused at the beginning of the prosecution period was as repre-
sented by the government's net worth statement.'8 Even though the
government's case shows an increase of the taxpayer's assets, if the
opening net worth figure is wrong, then all of the caluculations are
wrong. The Court does not fully discuss what it means by the phrase
"reasonable certainty." In the Holland case, the government introduced
evidence of extreme economic hardship in the taxpayer's past financial
history. The taxpayer's past income tax returns were also introduced to
show that his reported income had been practically nil. The purpose of
this evidence was to prove that the taxpayer could not have had $113,000
in cash on hand at the beginning of the period as he maintained.
While it is not contended that this evidence was insufficient to refute
the taxpayer's claim, there seems to be a failure on the part of the Court
to discuss what evidence is necessary to show the accuracy of the govern-
ment's opening net worth statement with "reasonable certainty" in the
first instance. The burden upon the government in fraud and civil cases
should be to show that it has made an extensive investigation of the tax-
payer's records and has made inquiries of the banks and other financial
institutions and agencies with which he deals, his business associates,
his family, his attorney, etc., without being able to discover any assets
other than the ones included in its statement of opening net worth. Fur-
ther, the government should show the past financial history of the tax-
payer in order to ascertain the range within which the assets of the tax-
payer can be expected to fall. Such evidence will not prove beyond any
doubt that its figures are correct, but it is all that reasonably can be
expected of the government.
To place any greater burden upon the government would be to im-
pose an impossible task.19 The taxpayer has more and better knowledge
of his assets at any particular time than anyone else. So it will not be
impossible for him to show any inaccuracies in the government's figures
which may occur.2 0  Any less proof by the government should not be
considered as sufficient evidence of the accuracy of the opening net worth
figures to allow the government's case to go to the jury.
's Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121, 132 (1954).
Bryan v. United States, 175 F. 2d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1949) (dissenting opin-
ion). For examples of the type of evidence used in the past to establish the gov-
ernment's opening net worth statement see Friedburg v. United States, 348 U. S.
142 (1954) ; Schauerman v. United States, 174 F. 2d 985 (8th Cir. 1951).
"Still we must be careful that in the application of the rule, the burden of
proof is not shifted to the taxpayer. See United States v. Riganto, 121 F. Supp.




The Holland case establishes one rule upon which it is to be hoped
the taxpayer may rely. If he furnishes "relevant leads" as to the source
of assets claimed to be on hand at the opening date, it is incumbent upon
the government to check such leads. 21 "Relevant leads" may be defined
as those which are not too far removed and not impossible of being
checked, and which if true would establish the innocence of the taxpayer.
Failure to check such leads may be interpreted by the trial court to mean
that the leads would have verified such sources and that the government's
case is too weak to go to the jury. Unfortunately, this rule is watered
down by the Court's holding that though the government did fail to
track down leads given it in the Holland case, the showing made by the
government of the financial history of the taxpayer was conclusive proof
that he could not have had on hand at the opening date the hoard of
cash which he claimed. Therefore, the taxpayer must not assume that
the government is compelled under all circumstances to track down leads
which he provides.
e. Admissions
One type of proof frequently offered by the government in order to
prove its opening net worth figure is the introduction of books and
records of the accused and admissions made by him, i.e., extra-judicial
statements made after the fact to agents of the government charged with
investigating the offense. This raises the vitally important question of
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. As in the usual crimi-
nal case, the taxpayer has this privilege in tax evasion prosecutions, but
it may be waived if not seasonably claimed.2 2  Of course, a claim alone
does not establish the privilege. The government is entitled to a pro-
ceeding to compel testimony and so have the claim tested out.
28
2 Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121, 127 (1954).
-" United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931); Hanson v. United States,
186 F. 2d 61 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Nicola v. United States, 72 F. 2d 780 (3d Cir. 1934) ;
United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S. D. N. Y. 1953). The taxpayer must
make the claim of constitutional privilege to the revenue agent when asked for
books or testimony. Nicola v. United States, supra. There is no requirement that
the taxpayer be warned of his constitutional privilege before information is elicited.
Power v. United States, 223 U. S. 303 (1911) ; Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S.
613 (1895) ; United States v. Block, 88 F. 2d 618 (2d Cir. 1927).
_ United States v. Murdock, supra note 22. As to the power of the Commis-
sioner to compel testimony and to examine books, see INT. REv. CODE §§ 7602,
7604(a), 7605, 6501(a) (1954). The Constitutional privilege attaches to personal
records and partnership records since they, too, are considered personal records.
Hanson v. United States, 186 F. 2d 61 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Nicola v. United States,
72 F. 2d 780 (3d Cir. 1934) ; United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S. D. N. Y.
1953). But no privilege attaches to corporate or public records. There is a pos-
sible argument that since all records are required to be kept by the provisions of
INT. IEv. CODE §§ 446(a) and 446(c) (1954), they thereby become public records
and have no privilege. Such an argument was sustained under the similar provi-
sions of the Emergency Price Control Act. Shapiro v. United States, 333 U. S. 1
19551
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Assuming that the taxpayer does waive his constitutional immunity,
of what value are his admissions to the government? The Smith case
holds that they may be used as evidence but must be corroborated as in
other criminal cases.2 4  All admissions made after the fact, to a person
charged with investigating the possibility of wrong-doing and which
embrace an element vital to the government's case, must be corrobo-
rated.2 5  Any time a fact is sufficiently important for the government to
adduce extra-judicial statements of the accused bearing on its existence,
and it is relied upon to sustain the defendant's conviction, there is need
for corroboration. 26
The corroboration required is independent proof of the corpus delicti.
This requirement is recognized by the Court to force the government to
prove not only the commission of the crime, but who committed it. How-
ever, this is true in any crime involving scienter.2 7  It is not necessary
that the corroborative evidence prove the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, or by a preponderence of the evidence, as long as it is substantial
and the evidence as a whole is sufficient for a jury to find that the de-
fendant is guilty.28 The independent evidence may bolster the admissions
and thus prove the offense "through" the statments of the accused. 20
f. Source of Income
Once the government has proven that there is unreported income, it
must prove that the source of it is one that produces taxable income.
Some lower courts had taken the view that in order to do this, the gov-
ernment had to negate all possibilty of there being sources of non-taxable
income.30 Others had refused to place this "impossible burden" upon
(1947). So far, it has not been sustained under the Internal Revenue Code. For
an excellent discussion of this whole problem, see Norman Redlich, Searches,
Seizures, and Self-Incrimination in Tax Cases, 10 TAx L. Ray.-191, 192 (1955).
24 Admissions are universally held to be admissible in evidence against the party
making them in civil cases. WIGM RE, EVIDENCE § 1048 (1940). Therefore civil
cases are not included in this discussion.25 But the Court in the Holland case does leave the door open to the possibility
that the admissions may be made under such circumstances as to lend to them a
great degree of credibility, citing State v. Saltzman, 241 Iowa 1373, 44 N. W. 2d
24 (1950).
"0 Smith v. United States, 348 U. S. 147 (1954). The government had based its
finding of the value of the assets of the taxpayer at the opening date upon the tax-
payer's past financial history, which history was reconstructed from statements
made by the taxpayer.27 Forte v. United States, 94 F. 2d 236 (D. C. Cir. 1937).
"I Smith v. United States, 348 U. S. 147, 150 (1954) ; Heasley v. United States,
218 F. 2d 872 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Bell v. United States, 185 F. 2d 302 (4th Cir.
1950) ; Forte v. United States, 94 F. 2d 236 (D. C. Cir. 1937) ; Daeche v. United
States, 250 Fed. 566 (2d Cir. 1918). See also Pearlman v. United States, 10 F. 2d
460 (9th Cir. 1926).
29 Smith v. United States.
20 United States v. Fenwick, 177 F. 2d 397 (8th Cir. 1949); Bryan v. United
States, 175 F. 2d 223 (5th Cir. 1949).
[Vol. 33
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the government.31 Other courts went further, holding that when a dis-
crepancy between increased net worth and reported income was shown,
the burden of explanation shifted to the taxpayer.3 2
The Supreme Court, in the Holland case, held that proof of a likely
source from which the income could have arisen is sufficient to go to the
jury. But if the taxpayer supplies the government with relevant leads,
it is incumbent upon the government to track them down. 33
So the Court's view seems to be the intermediate one. The govern-
ment need show only that there is a source of income which is probably
capable of producing the alleged unreported taxable income. It is not
necessary for it to go further and disprove the possibility of there being
any sources of non-taxable income. It has made out its prima facie case
upon showing the likely source of the unreported taxable income, which
income it claims is proven to exist through the employment of the net
worth method.
g. Willfulness
To sustain the imposition of the penalty for attempt to evade income
taxes, it must be shown that there was such an attempt.34 In order to
sustain a conviction for such an attempt, it must be shown that the at-
tempt was willful. 35  Merely establishing unreported taxable income is
not sufficient to show either.36 Willfulness is not proved by a mere
intentional act or omission, but there must be a corrupt intent to do the
wrong.37  A consistent pattern, over a number of years, of substantial
"
1 Bell v. United States, 185 F. 2d 302 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Brodella v. United States,
184 F. 2d 823 (6th Cir. 1950).
2 174 F. 2d 391 (8th Cir. 1949) end cases cited in United States v. Caserta, 199
F. 2d 905, 907 (3d Cir. 1952).
" One wonders how much the taxpayer may rely upon this rule in view of the
rule previously discussed concerning leads furnished as to possible sources of income
from which a cache of mony could have arisen and the qualification to that rule
that the government may not have to trace down even relevant leads if its case is
strong enough. However, notwithstanding the fact that the government's proof
in the Holland case was quite strong, the Court intimated that it would have re-
quired checking of leads had the taxpayer provided any which were relevant.
Though the taxpayer had given leads to the government as to the source of the
hoard of cash he claimed to have had at the opening date, he gave none as regards
a possible source of non-taxable income in the subsequent years.
The court remarked in Dupree v. United States, 218 F. 2d 781 (5th Cir. 1955),
that it had waited for the decisions in the four cases here under consideration in
order to receive guidance therefrom. It then held that the government, by affirma-
tive evidence, must negative all sources of non-taxable income before it has estab-
lished its prima facie case. For a statement of the law on this point in civil tax
fraud cases see, BALTER, FRAUD UNDER FEDERAL TAX LAW 175 (2d ed.; Chicago:
Commerce Clearing House, 1953).
" Morris Lipsitz, 21 T. C. 917 (1950).
" Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121, 139 (1954) ; United States v. Sulli-
van, 274 U. S. 255 (1927) ; United States v. Skidmore, 133 F. 2d 604 (7th Cir.
1941).
" Holland v. United States; 10 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOzE TAXATION
55.58 (Supp. Jan. 1955).
" United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389 (1933) ; 27 A-m. JuR., Income Taxes§ 250 (1940). Willfulness has been defined as "an act done with a bad purpose"
19551
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understatements of income is enough to sustain a criminal conviction
if coupled with a showing of a lack of records or exclusion of income from
the records, or other indirect evidence.38
h. Annual Accounting Period
It is further clear that proof of an understatement in some but not
all of the prosecution years will sustain a conviction only for those years
in which an understatement is proved. 0 There is a surprising tendency
on the part of the courts in both civil and criminal cases to allow the
government to allocate the income it has discovered by use of the net
worth method equally over the years in question. Then the taxpayer-is
obliged to come forward and show that this is an improper allocation.4"
Conclusion
just what effect the four cases will have upon the proceedings in
lower courts is problematical. Except for those few rules previously
accepted in some lower courts and rejected in these cases, it is doubtful
that the decisions will cause much change in the holdings of the lower
courts. The rules formulated for the guidance of the lower courts are
unfortunately too nebulous and shadowy to be of much practical help,
except that the lower courts are now on notice that the Supreme Court
does think cases involving the use of the net worth method should be
regarded with some suspicion and so should be closely scrutinized to
protect the rights of the taxpayer.
The opinions of the Court do apparently cast a greater burden upon
the government to establish its prima facie case, but just how great a
burden this turns out to be will have to await the light of later decisions
of the lower courts interpreting these opinions, or possibly even further
decisions of the Supreme Court.
Until that time, it is hoped that the courts will closely scrutinize
cases involving the use of the net worth method and that the Department
or "without justifiable excuse" or with "careless disregard whether or not one has
the right so to act." 10 MERTENs, LAw oF FEDERAL INcomE TAxATioN 55.41(1948).
" Double sets of books, false entries or authorizations, false invoices or docu-
ments, destruction of books and records, concealment of assets or covering up
sources of income, handling of one's affairs in a manner to avoid the making of
records usual in such transactions, and any other conduct, the likely effect of which
would be to mislead or conceal. Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492 (1943);
United States v. Clark; 123 F. Supp. 608 (S. D. Cal. 1954).
"' Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121, 129 (1954).
"United States v. Ridley, 120 F. Supp. 530 (N. D. Ga. 1954) ; Estate of Bart-
lett, 22 T. C. No. 151 (1954). Another interesting case is Harry B. Mikelberg,
23 T. C. No. 41 (1954), where income of husband and wife, both physicians, who




of Justice and the Internal Revenue Service will not abuse the use of the
method.
NELsoN W. TAYLOR, III.
Statutes-Interpretation of "Residence"
The North Carolina Supreme Court was recently faced with the
problem of interpreting the word "residing" in what appears to be a
new setting. In Barker v. Iowa Mutual Insurance Company,' the court
determined that a minor and dependent son, though married and living
in another city while attending college, was "residing with" his father
within the meaning of the clause in a fire insurance policy covering per-
sonalty "belonging to the insured or any member of the family of and
residing with, the insured, while elsewhere than on the described prem-
ises."2 The court said that the term "residing with" was equivalent to
having a residence with the insured, construing the word residence to
mean domicile.
Whether or not a particular place is a person's residence or domicile
has long been a problem. This problem is always acute since a person
must have a residence or domicile in a particular place for many pur-
poses. Among these purposes for which a person's residence or domicile
is important are attachment,3 candidacy for office, 4 registration of chattel
mortgages and conditional sales contracts,5 as executor or administrator
of a decedent's estate,6 divorce,7 homestead,8 both petit and grand jury
service,9 in actions before a justice of the peace,'0 as a candidate for the
state bar examination," naturalization,' 2 service of process on nonresi-
1241 N. C., 397, 85 S. E. 2d 305 (1955).
'Id. at 399, 85 S. E. 2d at 306.
*E.g., Brann v. Hanes, 194 N. C. 571, 140 S. E. 292 (1927) ; N. C. GEN. STAT.
§1-440.3 (1953).
'E.g., Hannon v. Grizzard, 89 N. C. 115 (1883).
'E.g., Sheffield v. Walker, 231 N. C. 556, 58 S. E. 2d 356 (1950); Industrial
Discount Corp. v. Radecky, 205 N..C. 163, 170 S. E. 640 (1933); Weeks v. Adams,
196 N. C. 512, 146 S. E. 130 (1928) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20.2 (1953).
' E.g., Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Finch, 232 N. C. 485, 61 S. E. 2d 377
(1950).
'E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945) ; McLean v. McLean,
233 N. C. 139, 63 S. E. 2d 138 (1950) ; Henderson v. Henderson, 232'N. C. 1, 59
S. E. 2d 227 (1950) ; Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N. C. 287, 45 S. E. 2d 57 (1947);
N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-5 (4), 50-5 (6), 50-6 (1950 as amended 1953).
' E.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 172 N. C. 663, 90 S. E. 801 (1916) ; Cromer v. Self.
149 N. C. 164, 62 S. E. 885 (1908) ; Fulton v. Roberts, 113 N. C. 422, 18 S. E. 510
(1890) ; Munds v. Cassidey, 95 N. C. 558, 4 S. E. 353 (1887) ; N. C. CoIsT. Art. X,§ 1.
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